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Situating Ourselves in History 
Steven D. Smith* 
On the verge of the new millennium, the eminent historian Jacques 
Barzun, possibly the most learned person then alive, observed that as the 
twentieth century was winding down “[a] wider and deeper scrutiny is 
needed to see that in the West the culture of the last 500 years is ending at 
the same time.”1  “[T]he culture,” Barzun lamented, “is old and unraveling.”2  
Over the last centuries, the West “has offered the world a set of ideas and 
institutions not found earlier or elsewhere.”  In developing these “ideas and 
institutions,” however, the West “has pursued characteristic purposes . . . 
and now these purposes . . . are bringing about its demise.”3 
There is, to be sure, much to question in Barzun’s elegy, and to quarrel 
with—its air of fatalism, for one thing.  Arnold Toynbee, another historian 
of massive erudition and morose disposition, cautioned that history, while 
exhibiting discernible recurring patterns, is not ultimately deterministic.4  In 
addition, it is perilous to try to discern our own place in the broad panorama 
of history.  With our faces pressed against the canvas, how can we see the 
whole picture?  Thus, the annals are replete with people who mistakenly 
believed they were living on the brink of the apocalypse (and also of people 
who erroneously expected to see the Millennium—the one where lions eat 
grass and lie down with lambs—or some secular variant thereof).  
And yet . . . looking backward, we can perceive that for all the 
incorrigible unruliness of history, and all the divergent interpretations, there 
have been periods about which we can say, with some assurance, that things 
 
 *  Co-Executive Director for the Institutes of Law & Religion and Law & Philosophy and 
Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law. 
 1.  JACQUES BARZUN, FROM DAWN TO DECADENCE: 1500 TO THE PRESENT ix (2000). 
 2.  Id. at xiii. 
 3.  Id. at xv. 
 4.  ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE, A STUDY OF HISTORY: RECONSIDERATIONS 518 (1961) (asserting that 
“patterns in the course of human affairs are not predetermined or inevitable”). 
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were not just the usual “one damn thing after another” (as Winston Churchill 
supposedly said): rather, a culture or civilization was in a condition of 
decline or collapse while another and different kind of culture was emerging 
(and not for better).  And sometimes people living in these times of decline 
had a sense of their situation.  The fourth and fifth centuries in the Roman 
Empire were such a period: and most students of history have not regarded 
the consequences—the short term consequences, at least (“short term” in this 
context meaning something like the next several centuries)—as happy ones.5  
The fifteenth and sixteenth centuries in Western Europe were another such 
period, and again the short term consequences (“short term” now meaning a 
century, give or take) were uncomfortable: the French Wars of Religion, the 
Thirty Years War.6  It may be, as Barzun and others have thought,7 that we 
are in the midst of another such period of major transformation, and that 
there are “signs of the times” to suggest as much.  If so, that fact presumably 
ought to affect our interpretations of the events and trends of our own time. 
I indulge in these reflections only because they may help to illuminate 
the important but elusive differences between the views and interpretations 
presented in my Brandeis lecture and in The Rise and Decline of American 
Religious Freedom and those expressed in the comments by Professors 
Koppelman, Tebbe, and Horwitz.  Any author would be gratified to be 
blessed with such perceptive, knowledgeable, and also charitable critics.8  
Their comments raise a host of important particular questions and 
challenges; I could not possibly address all or even very many of these in a 
 
 5.  See, e.g., BRYAN WARD-PERKINS, THE FALL OF ROME AND THE END OF CIVILIZATION 
(2005) (responding vigorously and critically to revisionist and more benign interpretations of the fall 
of the Roman Empire). 
 6.  Critics differ in their assessments of the longer-term consequences.  For the most part, the 
modern view has been that the change was a good one.  But see BRAD GREGORY, THE UNINTENDED 
REFORMATION (2012). 
 7.  See, e.g., HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION 39 (1983) (asserting that “the 
historical soil of the Western legal tradition is being washed away in the twentieth century, and the 
tradition itself is threatened with collapse”).  A more grandiose version of this narrative of decline 
came from sociologist PITIRIM SOROKIN, THE CRISIS OF OUR AGE (1941).  And of course there is 
OSWALD SPENGLER, THE DECLINE OF THE WEST (1918 - 1923). 
 8.  Although critical, all three commentators are generous—more generous than I deserve, I am 
afraid.  And I have surely learned as much from them as they have from me.  As it happens, Paul 
Horwitz is not the first to describe me as a conservative or religious “crit.”  I associate Critical Legal 
Studies with a time when legal scholarship was more probing and alive than it has since become, and 
so I humbly accept this designation—so long, that is, as I am not called upon to explain Gramsci, 
Hegel, the early Marx, Derrida, or deconstruction. 
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brief Response.  And in any case, taking the arguments one-by-one, I am 
inclined to agree with more in the comments than I disagree with.  And yet it 
seems clear that the commentators mean to be critical (even if respectfully 
critical), and that their views and mine are far from being in alignment.  
How then to explain our simultaneous agreements and divergences? 
One major difference, it seems, is not so much of substance as of tone, 
or perhaps attitude.  Koppelman and Tebbe accept large parts of my 
diagnosis of difficulties in modern religion clause jurisprudence, but they are 
puzzled that I find these difficulties so worrisome.   Thus, Koppelman 
admits that rejection of special protection for religious freedom has achieved 
“hegemonic” status among legal academics,9 but he doubts that this view is 
widely shared in the general population.  Our failures on the level of theory 
need not translate into lack of protection in practice; there is thus no warrant 
for the “gloom”10 expressed in the book.  Tebbe argues that if religious 
freedom comes to lose its special status in constitutional law, religious actors 
may nonetheless be almost as fully protected, or possibly even better 
protected, by other constitutional rights and doctrines—free speech and 
equal protection, for example.11 
I can grant these points and still wonder at the easy cheerfulness of these 
responses.  But different attitudes—my “gloom” and Koppelman’s 
characteristic and enviable optimism, for example—may be explicable 
against the backdrop of different implicit background historical narratives.12  
If your implicit historical picture is of “business-as-usual,” or better yet of 
reliably predictable even if uneven progress,13 then a judicial debacle or a 
 
 9.  Andrew Koppelman, Theorists, Get Over Yourselves: A Response to Steven D. Smith, 41 
PEPP. L. REV. 937, 938 (2014). 
 10.  Id. at 944. 
 11.  Nelson Tebbe, The End of Religious Freedom: What is at Stake?, 41 PEPP. L. REV. 963, 970 
(2014). 
 12.  On the influence of often implicit historical narratives, see CHRISTIAN SMITH, MORAL, 
BELIEVING ANIMALS 63–94 (2003).  On the importance of background as opposed to foreground 
factors, see Lawrence Lessig, Erie-Effects of Volume 110: An Essay on Context in Interpretive 
Theory, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1785 (1997). 
 13.  Both these comments and their work in general suggest the influence on Koppelman and 
Tebbe of a narrative that has been powerfully influential especially in the academy and that we 
might call “the Enlightenment story.”  This is a grand historical narrative that tells how, beginning 
perhaps around the fifteenth century and then gathering momentum in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, something called “Reason” emerged and began to push back the darkness of 
Tradition and Superstition that had prevailed since Late Antiquity.  The breakthrough of Reason 
portended a course of Progress in the governance of humankind: it could be anticipated that humans 
[Vol. 41: 983, 2014] Situating Ourselves In History 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
986 
theoretical embarrassment here and there are regrettable but not especially 
alarming.  Win a few, lose a few.  Such is life.   Things may be in disarray at 
the moment, but there is a good chance that next year will be better. 
Conversely, if you perceive that our culture seems to be in the midst of a 
major transformation, and if you also believe that a commitment to religious 
freedom has been one of the defining “ideas and institutions” mentioned by 
Barzun that has been central to a distinctive Western civilization that now 
shows signs of “unraveling,” things look different.  The erosion of that 
commitment together with a “hegemonic” view among academics that the 
commitment is no longer defensible may seem more momentous– 
momentous in its own right and also as symptomatic of a larger and 
potentially worrisome change in which the center can no longer hold.14  By 
the same token, you can agree with Tebbe (as I do) that “social and political 
dynamics”15 will ultimately count for more than constitutional decisions and 
doctrines, and yet worry about academic and judicial developments precisely 
because these are one important indicator of the direction in which such 
dynamics seem to be carrying us (and also because, beyond their immediate 
practical consequences, the doctrines and decisions are among the important 
shapers of “social and political dynamics”). 
Paul Horwitz comments explicitly on the difference in attitudes.  He 
 
would become progressively more free from want, oppression, and prejudice. On the influence of the 
Enlightenment story, see Smith, supra note 12, at 71.  Some might think that the horrific events of 
the twentieth century would have decisively discredited this story.  And yet the story is tenacious: its 
central themes—reason, progress, suspicion of tradition, a propensity to classify opposition under 
the heading of “prejudice”—remain pervasive, especially among those who like to call themselves, 
revealingly, “progressives.”  
 14.  Actually, even without supposing any sort of major historical transition, Koppelman’s 
complacency about the consequences of academic opinion seems to me unwarranted.  He notes 
Keynes’ observation about the long-term consequences of ideas, Koppelman, supra note 9, at 944; 
that observation seems pertinent in this context.  As an analogy, the Court’s decision in Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), invalidating a law prohibiting homosexual conduct, might plausibly be 
seen as ratifying the academic consensus that had come to prevail four decades earlier in association 
with the celebrated Hart-Devlin debate (a debate that flourished, perhaps not coincidentally, when 
Anthony Kennedy, author-to-be of the majority opinion in Lawrence, was a law student).  See 
ROBERT GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL 49 (1993) (observing that “[m]any, . . . perhaps even most, 
think that Hart carried the day . . . “).  Similarly, if it comes to be widely accepted in the legal 
academy that special constitutional treatment for religion is unjustified, odds are that this consensus 
sooner or later will manifest itself in positive law as well.  This is a point, to be sure, about the long 
term influence of academic opinion, not about the efficacy of theorizing itself: one can acknowledge 
the likely force of an academic consensus even while doubting (as I do, in both of these instances) 
the cogency of the theorizing that ostensibly supports that consensus. 
 15.  Tebbe, supra note 11, at 980. 
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thinks that while acknowledging the shortcomings and intermittent tragedies 
of the “American settlement” that prevailed in the nineteenth- and early 
twentieth-centuries, I nonetheless seem “optimistic” about the earlier 
arrangement and “pessimistic” about our present situation.  Horwitz, 
conversely, while acknowledging current problems, would mostly reverse 
these valuations: to him, “things look pretty damn good” today, at least by 
contrast to earlier decades.16 
As it happens, if we were just to consider, say, the years 1850 and 2000 
as frozen moments extracted from the flow of history, I might be inclined to 
agree with Horwitz.  I pick the year 2000, not 2014: even in the last few 
years, much has changed to affect and perhaps alter the comparative 
assessment.  And that is the point: once again, if current events are viewed 
as indications of an ongoing shift to some significantly altered legal and 
cultural arrangement, our judgments may change. 
But then why should we suppose that we are in the midst of some 
epochal transition to a very different and uncertain political future?  Surely 
the say-so of a few curmudgeonly prophets like Barzun is not enough to go 
on (even acknowledging their erudition).  Admitting that the attempt to 
situate ourselves in history and to discern its larger flow is inherently 
speculative, I offer four observations.  These are contestable observations, to 
be sure, and although I believe they could be supported (and some of them 
are argued for more fully in the book), they are stated here in baldly 
conclusory form for your consideration. 
First, the distinctive commitment to religious freedom as we have 
known it in America is to a large extent the product of Christian themes 
developed and implemented in the West over centuries within the 
framework of what has been, in its foundations and governing aspirations if 
only erratically in its practices, a Christian civilization.17 
Second, as a matter both of history and of unfolding logic, the 
commitment to religious freedom has expanded or spilled over into support 
for other valued and overlapping rights, conveniently if loosely clustered 
around the First Amendment—freedom of conscience, freedom of thought, 
freedom of speech, freedom of association. 
 
 16.  Paul Horwitz, More “Vitiating Paradoxes”: A Response to Steven D. Smith, 41 PEPP L. REV. 
943, 952–53 (2014). 
 17.  This claim is argued for at greater length in chapter 1 of the book.  More generally, see the 
impressively erudite if oddly entitled DAVID BENTLEY HART, ATHEIST DELUSIONS: THE CHRISTIAN 
REVOLUTION AND ITS FASHIONABLE ENEMIES (2009).  
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Third, and consequently, the relinquishment of the distinctive 
commitment to religious freedom may undermine the foundations of these 
other rights as well.  I understand that even someone who accepts my first 
and second observations might dispute this third claim.   In his Memorial 
and Remonstrance, however, James Madison warned that if the right to 
religious freedom is not secure, then all other rights will be likewise 
imperilled.18  And more recent history offers some limited confirmation.  
Thus, with the benefit of two-plus centuries of additional experience, Rajeev 
Barghava reports that “states that fail to protect religious freedom usually 
trample on other freedoms too.”19  (To be sure, the matter is complex: 
correlation is not equivalent to causation.) 
Fourth, modern judicial and academic discourse has almost wholly 
detached the constitutional protection for religious freedom from its 
Christian or Judeo-Christian sources and has ruled inadmissible the 
supporting theological rationales.  And it is far from clear that secular 
substitutes can do the job.  Consequently, Douglas Laycock reports that 
“scholars from all points on the spectrum now question whether there is any 
modern justification for religious liberty.”20  At the same time, a movement 
of secular egalitarianism has arisen that is often openly antagonistic to 
traditional religion and hence to the traditional commitment to religious 
 
 18.  The right to religious freedom, Madison argued, “is held by the same tenure with all our 
other rights. . . .” 
Either, then, we must say that the will of the Legislature is the only measure of their 
authority, and that in the plenitude of this authority, they may sweep away all our 
fundamental rights; or, that they are bound to leave this particular right untouched and 
sacred.  
JAMES MADISON, A MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS (1785), 
REPRINTED IN THE SACRED RIGHTS OF CONSCIENCE 309, 313 (Daniel L. Dreisbach & Mark David 
Hall eds. 2009).  
 19.  RAJEEV BHARGAVA, REHABILITATING SECULARISM, IN RETHINKING SECULARISM 99 (Craig 
Calhoun et al. eds. 2011). 
 20.  Douglas Laycock, Sex, Atheism, and the Free Exercise of Religion, 88 DETROIT-MERCY L. 
REV. 407, 423 (2011).  See, e.g., BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? (2012); Micah 
Schwartzman, What If Religion Is Not Special?, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1351 (2012); Gemma 
Cornelissen, Belief-Based Exemptions: Are Religious Beliefs Special?, 25 RATIO JURIS 85 (2012); 
CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE 
CONSTITUTION (2007); Anthony Ellis, What is Special about Religion?, 25 LAW & PHIL. 219 
(2006); James W. Nickel, Who Needs Freedom of Religion?, 76 COLO. L. REV. 941 (2005); Gidon 
Sapir & Daniel Statman, Why Freedom of Religion Does Not Include Freedom from Religion, 24 
LAW & PHIL. 467–505 (2005). 
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freedom.21  As the spectacular advances of the campaign for same-sex 
marriage reflect, this movement begins to look like a sort of an impatient 
political juggernaut with the power to overwhelm pundits and professors and 
politicians (including some politicians who never stand for election), and to 
flatten both centuries-old understandings of vital institutions such as 
marriage as well as long-standing procedural commitments (such as the 
venerable notion that major constitutional issues ought to be decided 
forthrightly and in the context of live and disputed controversies, not 
through misdirection in feigned cases).22  Secular egalitarianism, like some 
contemporary Spiritus Mundi, slouches toward becoming a new and 
dominant secular orthodoxy,23 muscling aside the centuries-old Christian one 
from which the commitment to religious freedom (and so much else24) 
developed. 
I submit that all of these observations are at least plausible, and that 
their conjunction supports an interpretation of current developments from a 
Barzunesque in contrast to either a “business-as-usual” or a “progressive” 
 
 21.  See generally Laycock, supra note 20, at 412–15.  See also Douglas Laycock, Religious 
Liberty and the Culture Wars, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2014), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2304427. 
 22.  See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2698–700 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting); 
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2674–75 (2013). 
 23.  Writing presciently a third of a century ago, the sociologist and political theorist Robert 
Nisbet observed the potential power of what he called “the New Equality.”  ROBERT NISBET, 
TWILIGHT OF AUTHORITY 180–93 (1975).  Nisbet argued that “[e]quality has a built-in revolutionary 
force lacking in such ideas as justice or liberty.” 
Equality feeds on itself as no other single social value does.  It is not long before it 
becomes more than a value.  It takes on . . . all the overtones of redemptiveness and 
becomes a religious rather than a secular idea. 
Id. at 184.  Nisbet commented that 
it would be hard to exaggerate the potential spiritual dynamic that lies in the idea of 
equality at the present time.  One would have to go back to certain other ages, such as 
imperial Rome, in which Christianity was generated as a major historical force, or 
Western Europe of the Reformation, to find a theme endowed with as much unifying, 
mobilizing power, especially among intellectuals, as the idea of equality carries now. 
Id.  If Nisbet’s observations were broadly accurate in 1975, they seem even more apt today. 
 24.  Cf. Hart, supra note 17, at 32–33 (“Even the most ardent secularists among us generally 
cling to notions of human rights, economic and social justice, providence for the indigent, legal 
equality, or basic human dignity that pre-Christian Western culture would have found not so much 
foolish as unintelligible.  It is simply the case that we distant children of the pagans would not be 
able to believe in any of these things– they would never have occurred to us– had our ancestors not 
once believed that God is love, that charity is the foundation of all virtues, that all of us are equal 
before the eyes of God, that to fail to feed the hungry or care for the suffering is to sin against Christ, 
and that Christ laid down his life for the least of his brethren.”). 
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perspective.  But I emphatically do not mean to lapse into any sort of 
historical fatalism.  Much remains open and undecided.  The egalitarian 
movement that looks so irresistible at the moment could turn out to be short-
lived, as other “progressive” enthusiasms (such as eugenics, or prohibition) 
have sometimes done.  Current decisions adverse to Christian photographers 
and bakers25 could provoke a backlash, reversing trends (and perhaps 
creating new and different dangers).  Religious revivals have occurred 
sporadically and unpredictably throughout American history; a new but no 
doubt different kind of revival might be in the offing.  Any number of things 
could happen. 
So the future of religious freedom remains very much in the balance.  
Views and conclusions will inevitably vary, as the perceptive comments by 
Professors Koppelman, Tebbe, and Horwitz demonstrate.  All of this is 




 25.  See Elane Photography v. Willcock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013); Craig v. Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, Inc., CR 2013-0008 (Colo. Office of Admin. Cts. 2013) (initial decision). 
